We examine the consequences of costly enforcement on the ability of voluntary agreements with industries to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. A voluntary agreement can be more efficient in reaching an aggregate emissions target than a conventional emissions tax, but only if: (1) profitable voluntary agreements in which members of the agreement pay for its enforcement exist; (2) members of a voluntary agreement actually bear the costs of enforcing the agreement; (3) the agreement is enforced by a thirdparty, not the government, and (4) this third-party enforcer has a significant advantage in monitoring technology and/or available sanctions over the government.
Introduction
In recent years there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary environmental agreements between regulators and polluting industries in place of standard regulatory approaches. Voluntary agreements are thought to have a number of advantages over traditional regulation. Firms may enjoy significant cost-savings from having increased flexibility in deciding how to meet an environmental target (Baggot 1986; Goodin 1986) . Furthermore, voluntary agreements may require less time to implement relative to more traditional forms of regulation and may reduce conflicts between regulators and firms that often occur in this process (Segerson and Miceli 1998) . Finally, some authors have suggested that voluntary agreements may be cheaper to enforce than traditional regulations (Bailey 1999; Schmelzer 1999; Nyborg 2000; Brouhle et al. 2005; Croci 2005) . While the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental regulation has progressed quite far in the last decade, few studies have rigorously addressed the problem of enforcing voluntary environmental agreements. This paper examines the consequences of enforcement costs and who bears these costs on the ability of voluntary agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of voluntary participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and an emissions tax.
Voluntary environmental agreements are typically categorized as being one of three forms (Mazurek 1998; Carraro and Leveque 1999; Segerson and Li 1999; Alberini and Segerson 2002; Lyon and Maxwell 2002; Morgenstern and Pizer 2007) .Unilateral agreements are environmental initiatives developed and implemented by firms or industries without any regulatory involvement. Public agreements are agreements in which a regulator sets the requirements and rewards of membership in a program and firms or industries voluntarily decide whether to participate. 1 Under negotiated agreements, environmental targets are jointly agreed upon by a regulator and a firm, or between a regulator and industry association. In this paper we focus exclusively on a particular form of negotiated agreement in which a regulator commits to not impose a regulation on an industry (e.g., an emissions tax) if it can voluntarily meet the regulator's environmental target. This is the most common voluntary approach in Europe (Borkey and Leveque 2000; Conrad 2001). Examples include the Netherland's Environmental Plan for limiting carbon emissions (i.e., the "Dutch Covenants"), France's agreement on the treatment of end-of-life vehicles, and the United Kingdom's Climate Change Agreements.
Compliance with negotiated agreements, like more traditional forms of regulation, must be enforced. This is particularly true when firms' emissions are not easily observed and the government's decision to allow a voluntary agreement is not easily reversed. In these cases a firm may be motivated to join an agreement to help prevent the imposition of some conventional regulation, but then decide not to reduce its emissions to the extent required under the agreement. 2 If this occurs, then the environmental goals of the agreement will not be achieved.
Consequently, existing agreements include both monitoring and sanctioning components. Moreover, there is substantial variation in how these agreements are enforced. Some agreements focus on the compliance of individual firms. Monitoring in these agreements may rely on firms submitting self-reports of their emissions or other activities to a third-party or branch association as under the United Kingdom's Climate Change Agreements (Bailey and Rupp 2006), the Netherland's covenants for reducing carbon emissions (Ministry of Economic Affairs 1999), and Chilean agreements on chemical emissions (Jimenez 2007) . Given infor-
